Decentralization, Governance, and the Structure of Local Political Institutions: Lessons for Reform? by Hankla, Charles R. & Downs, William M.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Faculty Publications Department of Political Science
2010
Decentralization, Governance, and the Structure of
Local Political Institutions: Lessons for Reform?
Charles R. Hankla
Georgia State University, chankla@gsu.edu
William M. Downs
Eastern Carolina University, downsw14@ecu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hankla, Charles R. and Downs, William M., "Decentralization, Governance, and the Structure of Local Political Institutions: Lessons
for Reform?" (2010). Political Science Faculty Publications. 14.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub/14
 1 
 
Decentralization, Governance, and the Structure of Local Political 
Institutions:  Lessons for Reform?  
 
Charles R. Hankla 
polcrh@langate.gsu.edu 
 
William M. Downs 
polwmd@langate.gsu.edu  
 
Department of Political Science 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA 30302 
USA 
 
Forthcoming from Local Government Studies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Many governments are devolving power to elected local councils, hoping to improve service 
delivery and citizen representation by bringing officials closer to the people.  While these 
decentralization reforms hold the promise of improved governance, they also present national 
and sub-national leaders with a complex array of options about how to structure newly 
empowered local political institutions.  This article draws on cross-national experience and the 
latest research to identify the trade-offs inherent in structuring local political institutions. The 
study’s specific interest is in the impact of strong, locally elected councils on governance and 
representation.  Proceeding from an empirical basis that competitive elections are vital for the 
legitimacy and efficiency of local political institutions, the analysis first questions the impact of 
four institutional features – central versus local control, local executive versus local council 
authority, local council structure, and the role of parties – on service provision and fiscal 
solvency.  The article’s second section analyses the impact of decentralization on political 
representation, with a particular focus on the role of institutional design in combating the threat 
of extremist parties.  A final section summarizes empirical findings and advances some policy-
relevant conclusions. 
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 Many governments are devolving power to elected local councils, hoping to improve 
service delivery and citizen representation by bringing officials closer to the people.  While these 
decentralization reforms hold the promise of improved governance, they also present national 
and sub-national leaders with a complex array of options about how to structure newly 
empowered local political institutions.  Because the experiences of decentralized countries 
around the world vary so dramatically these choices matter, and they may well make the 
difference between a successful and a failed reform program.  This article draws on cross-
national experience and the latest research to identify the trade-offs inherent in structuring local 
political institutions. Specifically, it focuses on the impact of strong, locally elected councils on 
governance quality and representation.  While much of the extant literature has either weighed 
the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization itself or focused on the fiscal structure of 
local government, the present study seeks to link the success of decentralization reforms more 
clearly with discrete institutional choices.   
 The article addresses the following research question: which types of local political 
institutions will tend to produce the best governance outcomes?  While national context is 
obviously a critical consideration when designing institutions, the purpose here is to identify any 
broader, cross-national patterns that may inform these decisions.  The article’s first section 
makes the case that competitive elections are vital for both the legitimacy and the effective 
functioning of local political institutions. It then moves to an examination of four institutional 
features – central versus local control, local executive versus local council authority, local 
council structure, and the role of parties – and their effects on governance quality and 
macroeconomic discipline.  The focus is on these two outcomes because they are, perhaps, the 
most commonly used to judge the performance of government at the local level, both by scholars 
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and by citizens.  As elaborated below, studying governance quality and macroeconomic 
discipline effectively encompasses additional issues such as local preference representation and 
corruption.  In its second section, the article analyses the impact of decentralization on political 
representation, with a particular focus on the threat of extremist parties.  A final section 
summarizes the key findings and conclusions. 
 
Local Government Structure, Governance Quality, and Macroeconomic Discipline 
 
It is important to define the structures of sub-national government and to clarify what is meant by 
―quality governance‖ and ―macroeconomic discipline.‖  The local council is defined as the 
supervisory-legislative body charged with such tasks as passing ordinances and approving 
budgets.   By contrast, the local executive, which may be popularly elected or chosen by the 
council, is responsible for such functions as implementing council decisions and drafting budget 
proposals.   Quality governance occurs when government officials focus on providing citizens 
with the public goods that they desire.  Doing so first requires governments to discern the 
preferences of the local electorate, so that the appropriate level and type of public goods can be 
provided.  It also requires officials to prioritize the provision of these public goods (such as 
education or health care) over the distribution of particularistic goods (such as subsidies or 
transfers) that use taxpayer money to benefit only a small group of influential citizens.  It is here 
that political institutions can be decisive, for they help determine whether officials have electoral 
incentives to serve the public will or to pay off supporters.  Macroeconomic discipline is 
manifested when local governments do not systematically run budget deficits.  Occasional 
deficits can be a rational response to unusual local challenges, such as natural disasters, but they 
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should not be sustained over the long run.  Such fiscal irresponsibility can lead to contracted 
local savings and reduced future income (Gale and Orszag 2003). 
  
The Role of Democratic Elections 
 Researchers largely agree that local democratic elections are necessary to realize the 
benefits of decentralization.  Decentralization is said to be advantageous because local 
governments are in a better position than national or provincial authorities to target public goods 
to the preferences of local citizens.  Without elections it is impossible to make local governments 
accountable to these citizens, reducing the probability of effective targeting (see Manor 1999, 
Bird and Vaillancourt 1998).  To take just one example, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007), in 
a quantitative analysis of 75 developing and transitioning countries, found that administrative 
decentralization alone did not improve service delivery or reduce corruption. 
There is also a broad consensus among scholars that electoral competitiveness, by 
threatening dishonest or incompetent officials with removal, tends to improve fiscal 
responsibility and governance quality.  In a study of Western European countries, Hallerberg 
(2004) found a link between high electoral competitiveness and lower budget deficits.  Similarly, 
Wibbels (2003) found that US states with greater electoral competitiveness were less likely to 
seek federal bailouts, although Remmer and Wibbels (2000) qualify that finding by arguing that 
competition only provides governance benefits in two-party and not multiparty systems.  
Competitive local government elections are certainly not the only means of inducing 
responsibility and accountability; indeed, other forms of citizen participation--e.g., referenda, e-
government, citizens panels, focus groups, public meetings, satisfaction surveys—may also 
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provide incentives for good governance and fiscal discipline (Wilson 1999).  Elections are, 
though, the most potent. 
     The beneficial effects of competition are most fully realized within the context of a stable 
party system.  Numerous studies have found a relationship between budget deficits and high 
turnover in the parties that control government.  When parties expect to lose their seats in an 
upcoming election, they have an incentive to overspend public money and leave the harmful 
effects of deficits to their successors (Roubini and Sachs 1988, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 
1991, Franzese 2002).  As a result, to encourage budgetary responsibility, competition should be 
strong enough to threaten dishonest officials with removal, but not so strong that successful 
parties have little hope of reelection.   
 
Local versus Central Control 
Assuming, then, that local governments are elected, should central governments 
interested in improving service delivery delegate more authority to local officials?  Tiebout 
launched the modern study of decentralization in 1956 by arguing that, if different local 
authorities prefer different fiscal policies, the devolution of some power to sub-national 
government should be efficient.  Which policy powers should be retained by the centre and 
which should be provided to sub-national authorities?  Oates (1972) famously argued that control 
over specific public goods should be delegated to the lowest tier of government where they do 
not produce significant cross-constituency spillover effects.  In Western Europe there are certain 
functions controlled at the local level virtually everywhere.  These include water supply, tourism, 
roads, building permits, sewage, trash, and libraries.  Other functions are controlled at the local 
level in the more decentralized states, and not in other states.  These functions include secondary 
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education (where personnel, buildings, and curriculum may be controlled at different levels, as in 
France), electricity, hospitals, and disaster response (Norton 1991).  In the recent South African 
reforms, which many observers consider  successful, policies such as unemployment insurance, 
immigration, and defense are retained by the centre, education, health, and roads are shared by 
the centre, the province, and the locality (with the local authority’s role primarily in 
administering programs), and water, sewage, and refuse are left solely to the locality (Wehner 
2000).   
For sub-national governments to be sufficiently independent to generate the benefits of 
decentralization, it is necessary for reformers to get the fiscal system right.  For local 
governments to have any authority, they must at a minimum have control over their budgets.  In 
other words, if local authorities are receiving their funding from central or regional governments, 
these higher authorities must not constantly tie the funding to mandates, but rather leave some 
discretion to local officials.  More complete local independence requires not only spending 
autonomy, but also taxation autonomy.  If local governments have the freedom to raise their own 
revenues, not only can they target spending decisions to local preferences, but they can also 
adjust the size of government and balance the desire for spending against a willingness to pay the 
tax necessary to finance that expenditure (see von Hagen 2003, Rodden 2002). 
The governance implications of genuine decentralization continue to generate 
controversy, however, and empirical studies on both sides of the issue abound.  To provide some 
representative examples, Lewis (1998) found that decentralization improved water services in 
Kenya, while Parry (1997) found no improvement after the decentralization of education in 
Chile.  Huther and Shah (1998) associated decentralization with reduced corruption, while 
Triesman (2002, 2007) found no impact.  Von Braun and Grote (2002) argued that more 
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decentralization reduces poverty, but Davoodi and Zoe (1997) linked decentralization with 
slower growth.  Wibbels (2000) found that federated states are likely to experience higher 
inflation, whereas Estache and Sinha (1995) concluded that fiscal decentralization tends to 
increase both total and subnational spending on public infrastructure. 
Increasingly, scholars are eschewing categorical statements about the benefits and harms 
of decentralization in favor of seeking to identify the conditions under which decentralization 
best lives up to its potential.  Summarizing the state of the literature, Hankla (Forthcoming) 
identified nine conditions under which decentralization should provide benefits, all other things 
being equal.  These conditions included democratic elections, sub-national budgetary and 
expenditure freedom, sub-national access to administrative resources, and regional equity 
transfers by the centre.  Rodden (2006) argued that the potential risk of fiscal indiscipline can be 
greatly ameliorated by central governments either by restricting local government borrowing or 
by imposing a credible no bailout policy.  Treisman (2000) argued that decentralization, by 
producing more ―veto players‖ who must be consulted before policy can be changed, tends to 
lock in preexisting rates of inflation, whether high or low.  In a similar analysis, Nooruddin 
(2008) showed that the increasing influence of state governments in India reduced growth rate 
volatility by allowing the country to commit to policy stability.  Rodden (2003) argued that 
clearly delineated responsibilities between the central and sub-national governments should 
improve governance by clarifying which level of government is responsible for specific policy 
decisions.   
Clearly, there is no consensus as to the general impact of decentralization on governance, 
and scholars are beginning to recognize the important mediating role played by the social, 
economic, and institutional characteristics of individual countries.  The theoretical case for the 
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benefits of decentralization remains strong, however, and the devolution of central authority 
seems to have been beneficial in certain national contexts.  To the extent that we can draw a 
conclusion from the literature, therefore, it is that decentralization holds out the promise of 
improved governance, but that its specific structure must be tailored to individual national 
circumstances. 
 
Local Council versus Local Executive Dominance 
 If national or provincial officials decide to delegate authority to the local level, what is 
the best way to structure the political institutions that will exercise this authority?  At issue, first, 
are the sorts of powers that might strengthen a local council vis-à-vis a local executive.  Most 
clearly, stronger councils will have significant authority over the budgetary process, with the 
power to initiate or amend taxation and spending proposals.  Furthermore, local councils are 
stronger when the reversion budget--the budget that is implemented when the executive and the 
legislature fail to agree--is either the prior year’s budget or the council’s preferred budget.  When 
the reversion budget is the executive’s proposal, local councils must agree on an alternative or 
allow the executive to dictate (Baldez and Carey 1999).  To be strong, local councils should also 
have sufficient resources, access to information, and expertise to oversee the bureaucracy 
operating within their purview (USAID 2000).  For example, the question of local council 
authority over the civil service has been a contentious one in India, where local councils in most 
states find themselves unable to oversee the actions of the district magistrates assigned to their 
constituencies. 
 A second source of authority for local councils is the power to select and remove the 
local executive.  When councils enjoy this authority, local government, to borrow a term 
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generally used at the national level, is ―parliamentary‖ in form.  The primary advantage of this 
form of government, from the perspective of the local council, is that executive authority is 
directly responsible to the elected body.  In practice, the threat of central or provincial 
intervention makes it rare for local councils to summarily remove executives, even when they 
have the power to do so.  Nevertheless, appointment power and (where present) removal power 
can be significant sources of authority for local councils.  This is not to say that local councils in 
―presidential‖ systems, where the local executive is popularly elected, are always helpless.  
While councils in some systems enjoy the authority to remove an executive, those in a greater 
number enjoy sufficient power over the municipal or district budget to compel attention.   Based 
primarily on analyses of the national level, much of the literature in political economy finds that 
the presence of strong elected executives tends to improve both governance and macroeconomic 
discipline.  There is, however, another strong current in the literature that highlights the benefits 
of more collegial forms of executive authority. 
 The logic supporting executive authority is straightforward, but differs slightly for each 
outcome.  Strong executives are said to improve governance because they represent a broader 
constituency than members of the legislature, providing them with an incentive to provide public 
over particularistic goods.  While individual legislators (or, by extension, local council members) 
represent only a portion of the nation (or locality), executives are accountable to the entirety.  
They should therefore be less inclined to cement their authority with patronage and 
particularistic goods because of the difficulties of paying off all the relevant interests.  
Furthermore, executives (at least unitary executives) should be less susceptible to the kind of 
vote trading and logrolls that can drive up patronage spending in legislatures or councils.   
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 Similarly, strong executives should improve macroeconomic discipline by using their 
authority to overcome the common pooled resource problem inherent in budgetary politics.  
Where legislatures or councils have budgetary authority, such a problem materializes when each 
member internalizes all of the political benefits of directing public spending to supporters but 
accepts responsibility for only a portion of the harms resulting from unbalanced budgets (e.g., 
Roubini and Sachs 1989).  As a result, just as competing ships have an incentive to over-fish, 
legislators and council members with different interests have an incentive to overspend.  Strong 
executives can help rein in this spending by setting spending caps or negotiating among 
competing interests.   
One potential consequence of these arguments is that local executive authority should 
generally be identified with a single individual.  In his study of institutional design at the local 
level, Blair (1991) argued that strong local executives, whether directly elected, elected by the 
council, or chairing a committee of aldermen, tend to improve the locality’s financial balances.  
The focus of Blair’s study is to critique the British system (also used in Norway) of collegial 
executive authority vested in the local council itself.  Further, much research at the national level 
has found that collegial executives (found principally in coalition parliamentary and divided 
semi-presidential systems) are associated with budget imbalances (Roubini and Sachs 1988, 
Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de Haan 2001, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, 
Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999).  The logic here is the same as that outlined above – members of 
a collegial executive will represent particularistic interests and will have an incentive to direct 
resources to them at the expense of the collective.  For similar reasons, collegial executives may 
be less likely, other things being equal, to provide quality governance.  For example, Ehrlich 
(2007) found that countries with collegial executives tend to be more susceptible to special 
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interest pressure in formulating their trade policies.  Similarly, in a comparison of Indian states, 
Mukherjee (2003) showed that an increase in the number of legislative parties (which is 
associated with government coalition size) led to more subsidies and fewer public goods. 
 What does it mean to be a strong, unified executive?  Focusing on the national level, 
some scholars prefer presidential to parliamentary systems.  For example, Cheibub (2006) found 
that presidential systems are more likely to balance their budgets because voters can easily assign 
the blame for overspending to directly elected executives.  Most studies, however, simply 
emphasize the importance of a strong executive, however constituted.  Baldez and Carey (1999), 
in a close study of Chile, found that the president’s power to propose a budget, and the rules 
which make this budget law unless the legislature actively objects, have made the country one of 
Latin America’s most fiscally responsible.  Hallerberg and Marier (2004), examining Latin 
American presidential democracies more broadly, showed that strong presidents are able to rein 
in spending more effectively.  Finally, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Wade (1990) argued 
that economic reform is more likely to be successful in states with strong executives. 
 Organizing local government around a strong government is not, however, without its 
drawbacks.  One potential concern is that a strong executive may weaken local democracy and 
thereby undercut the responsiveness that motivates decentralization in the first place.  Can a 
strong executive represent the preferences of local citizens as effectively and fully as in a more 
council driven system?  Such a question should not be taken lightly.  For example, one could 
argue that collegial local government would bring more perspectives into the mix, producing 
highly quality policy outcomes.  Once a decision has been made, mutual pressures from council 
members to maintain single voice could then damper any vocal opposition.  A more collegial 
approach could also help ensure that a broader swath of the population supports any policy 
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changes, giving the action of the local government more legitimacy (see, for example, Gerring, 
Thacker, and Moreno 2006, Baylis 1980, Goodsell 1981).   
 There are also several alternatives to executive strength, at least for ensuring 
macroeconomic stability.  Careful central or provincial government controls can also help local 
authorities overcome the common pooled resource problem even in the absence of a strong local 
executive.  These controls might include limits on the ability of local governments to borrow on 
private markets or a credible no bailout policy (Rodden 2006). Strict budget rules can also be a 
substitute for executive strength.  A large literature has found a link between such rules, 
including agenda control, a strong finance minister, and inter-party pacts to balance the budget, 
and fiscal solvency (see Hallerberg 2004, Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery 1996, and Döring 2001).  
To take an example, Poterba (1994) found that American states with no-budget-carryover rules 
were better able to adjust to the fiscal shocks of the 1980s. 
 Based on these considerations, reformers on the ground are likely to be in the best 
position to judge whether the benefits of strong executive authority outweigh the strengths of 
more collegial systems.  Even in the context of executive strength, it is important to make clear 
that influential legislatures are vital components of good governance and democratic oversight.  
Despite the advantages of a strong executive, it is not enough simply to have an elected 
executive who runs local government alone.  Local councils provide an important oversight 
function, verifying that executives are carrying out their responsibilities honestly and effectively 
and making sure that all voices are heard.  They also add stability to the political system by 
increasing the number of ―veto players‖ who must concur with policy chance, contributing to a 
stable economic environment (see Tsebelis 1995, Haggard and McCubbins 2001, Hellman 1996, 
Gehlbach and Malesky 2008).   
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Structure of the Local Council 
 Is there an optimal number of elected members in a local council?  Past research gives us 
little guidance, but it identifies two potential trade-offs that should be considered.  First, there is 
a trade-off between representation and efficiency.  Given a particular municipality or district 
size, large local councils will be more representative because each member will stand-in for the 
interests of fewer constituents.  More voices can be heard and can have an influence on policy.  
On the other hand, large local councils will have more difficulty coordinating their members to 
produce policy decisions, making them less efficient (see Shugart and Carey 1992).  A second 
size trade-off concerns the balance between a local council large enough to oversee all facets of 
local government but small enough to minimize facility and staff costs (Nijzink et al. 2006).  
Central and provincial officials seeking to decentralize will have to make a political judgment 
about the relative importance of cost and efficiency on the one hand and representation and 
capability on the other. 
The size of local councils will be related to the population of the municipality or district 
that they oversee, a decision that entails yet a third trade-off.  Placing a local council over a large 
population increases the probability that the council (and the local executive) will have sufficient 
administrative support to carry out its functions.  The problem is that councils governing a large 
population will be less representative, even if they are comparatively large.  Such councils will 
be less able to target fiscal policy to the specific desires of the population because these desires 
will be more diverse. 
 A second issue concerns the electoral rule by which members of the council are chosen.  
At the local level, a system of proportional representation (PR) would normally mean taking the 
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entire locality as the electoral district and allocating seats to each party on the basis of the 
percentage of votes it received.  In a majoritarian system, the local unit would normally be 
divided into a multitude of districts, each of which would elect a single representative (or, rarely, 
multiple representatives).  What are the advantages and drawbacks of each approach?  
Proportional systems will generally lead to multiparty councils, as the threshold for winning 
seats in such systems is lower than in majoritarian systems (which Duverger 1954 famously 
associated with two parties).  The party system of a country will generally react to the electoral 
system at the national level, so the number of parties competing in local elections may be the 
same regardless of the local electoral rule.  To the extent that PR systems allow more parties to 
be represented in the local council, however, it may create coordination problems as 
representatives loyal to divergent parties try to overcome their differences.  Such a divergence of 
interest may be particularly serious if the executive is independently elected or appointed by the 
centre, as the pressure to choose an executive could help members overcome their differences 
(see Mainwaring 1993).  Because each local council member under PR will represent the entire 
district, however, they may be more likely to support public over private goods than would a 
member elected under majoritarian rules (see Rogowski 1987).  This disadvantage of 
majoritarian systems, however, can be partially overcome through the election of a few ―at large‖ 
members to represent the entire locality. 
 More generally, PR systems will tend to represent divergent groups or interests more 
completely than majoritarian systems, as each can express its interests through a party.  
Majoritarian systems, on the other hand, are better able to represent geographical diversity as 
each member is responsible to a smaller constituency.  Majoritarian systems may thus be more 
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appropriate for geographically diverse but ideologically homogenous localities, and PR systems 
for the opposite.   
Two more implications of electoral system choice should be noted.  First, political parties 
will generally play a major role in proportional electoral systems, and candidates elected under 
these systems will generally be responsive to the dictates of national party leaders.  Open list or 
single transferable vote systems of PR will tend to ameliorate these effects and provide greater 
incentives for candidates to pay attention to local interests.  The Iraqi national assembly recently 
voted to move from closed to open list provincial elections probably for this reason.  National 
parties may also play a major role in majoritarian systems, especially if they control nomination 
powers (rather than having the decision made through a primary).  On the other hand, 
majoritarian systems, unlike PR systems, will facilitate the participation of independent 
candidates, and can even be made non-partisan (Carey and Shugart 1995).  The implications of 
these choices will be elaborated more fully in the next section on parties. 
One final point about the determinants of national party influence on local elections--
national political concerns can often come to dominate local elections, sometimes turning them 
into little more than referenda on the performance of the central government.  Remmer and 
Gélineau (2003) found that sub-national elections in Argentina reflect voter preferences about 
the national level, and Rodden (2003) found similar results for Germany.  National politics will 
be especially significant in local elections when two conditions hold.  First, national trends are 
much more likely to matter when the national party system is replicated at the local level, either 
explicitly or implicitly.  Second, it is probable that when national and sub-national elections 
occur at the same time, the outcome of the sub-national election will be heavily influenced by 
national politics (see Weaver 2002).  In such a circumstance, voters are thinking about the 
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performance of the central government when they go to vote, and the coattail effects of co-
partisan national candidates should be significant.   
 A second implication of electoral system choice relates to redistricting and vote counting.  
On these scores, PR systems may have the edge because they do not require any districting or 
redistricting (at least when the entire locality makes up the electoral district).  Majoritarian 
systems, by contrast, will carve the local unit into electoral districts, the borders of which will 
have important implications for who wins the election.  As a result, the creation of these districts 
will be contested politically, a fight that will reoccur if population shifts require changing the 
borders in the future (Horowitz 2003).  Additionally, because an entire election in a majoritarian 
system hinges on the preferences of a single individual, the ideologically ―median‖ voter, close 
elections in these systems can generate political fights that would be absent in proportional 
systems (see Downs 1957). 
  
The Role of Parties 
 Is national party involvement in local elections good for governance and fiscal 
responsibility?  There are at least three reasons to think the answer is ―yes‖.  First, there is an 
emerging literature that links strong parties with quality governance and the provision of public 
over special interest benefits.  Parties are strong when central party leaders are able to discipline 
elected office-holders, often using their control over candidate nominations (Carey and Shugart 
1995).  Hankla (2006) and Nielson (2003) have shown that countries with stronger political 
parties tend to have less particularistic trade policies, while Hallerberg and Marier (2004) have 
demonstrated that strong parties promote fiscal discipline, especially when executives are weak.  
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Ames (1995), in an examination of Brazil, confirmed the role of weak parties in encouraging 
government to enact policies in the private rather than the national interest.   
The logic of these arguments is straightforward.  When parties are strong, national party 
leaders have significant influence over the decision-making of elected party officials at all levels 
of government.  These national leaders have an incentive to think about the national electoral 
prospects of the party, and therefore should be more responsive to the broad national interests 
than independently elected officials would normally be.  To the extent that these party leaders are 
able to dissuade elected officials from using the public treasury to pay off their supporters, and 
instead encourage them to provide public goods that may benefit the party as a whole, party 
strength should improve governance.  Among these public goods is fiscal discipline.  Just as 
strong executives have an incentive to rein in spending because they take all the blame for 
budget deficits, national party leaders understand that their organization as a whole will be 
punished at the ballot box for the irresponsibility of individual elected representatives.  When 
these national leaders are empowered to encourage fiscal propriety, they will.  As discussed 
briefly below, however, in the context of decentralization such ―encouragement‖ could 
unfortunately take the form of national interference in local budgetary decision-making. 
Much of the research that tackles the impact of party strength on governance focuses on 
the centre.  At that level, the question is whether parties are strong or weak, whereas at the local 
level the issue is more often whether national parties will become involved in elections or not.  
We addressed the institutional determinants of national party involvement in the previous 
section, asserting that partisan competition and synchronized election timing at both tiers should 
encourage the ―nationalization‖ of local elections.  What will be the consequences of this 
nationalization?  If central parties are strong, their involvement should improve both governance 
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and fiscal responsibility for the reasons highlighted above.  Central party involvement in 
provincial German elections has been shown to improve fiscal solvency (Rodden 2004).  Even 
involvement by weak national parties may improve local governance by directing attention to the 
broader implications of local policies.   
There are two additional benefits of national party involvement in local elections.  First, 
this involvement has the potential to increase the representation of local interests at the national 
level.  This representation should be especially apparent when central party leaders have risen 
from local politics or currently maintain local power bases, as in the French system of cumul des 
mandats (Loughlin and Seiler 2001).  Indeed, integrated parties can serve as effective means of 
communicating national interests to local authorities and local interests to national authorities, 
improving governance at all levels.  Second, national party influence in local elections may help 
to preserve the country’s territorial integrity by discouraging the rise of regional parties that seek 
independence or autonomy from the central government (see Weaver 2002).  Integrated national 
parties can play a significant role in binding together the various tiers of political authority in a 
decentralized country (Filippov, Ordeshook and Shevtsova 2004). 
If national party leaders have too much influence over the local authority, however, it will 
negate the benefits of decentralization by erasing the local accountability of elected officials.  As 
a result, in creating local political institutions, it is important for reformers to strike a balance 
between national party involvement and local autonomy.  Doing so may be a challenge, but one 
approach (among many) would be to allow national parties to compete in local elections while 
giving voters some influence over the specific candidates that are elected.   
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Political Representation, Extremism, and Social Divisions 
Decentralization to responsive local institutions carries with it the possibility of 
enhancing efficiency and increasing citizen participation through greater proximity to decision 
makers; it can, however, also bring new threats to political stability.  Creating or redesigning 
local councils typically elevates those territorial assemblies to a new status as meaningful 
political prizes.  In competitive party systems, empowered local, provincial and/or regional 
councils can then become windows of political opportunity for groups stuck in national 
opposition or excluded entirely from parliamentary representation.  New political formations will 
seek entry to local councils as a means of securing legitimacy and as a springboard for launching 
campaigns to enter national office.  Territorially-based ethnic minorities may look to local 
councils as opportunities for voice and some modicum of self-determination.   
Alongside the many gains that derive from the innovative redesign of local institutions 
comes the possibility of emboldening the centrifugal forces of localism.  Importantly, the risks 
associated with decentralization should not become a convenient justification for avoiding it; to 
the contrary, their recognition must simply guide those with power to shape and reshape local 
political institutions.  This section addresses two potential threats to political stability that may 
result from how citizens are represented at the local level – e.g., extremism and social divisions.  
Most of the literature on decentralization and extremism focuses on Western Europe, and it is 
from this continent that we draw most of our conclusions.   
 
Guarding Against Local Political Extremism 
Among the most important political challenges in decentralizing countries is the rise or 
resurgence of organized extremism.  In many decentralized political systems, especially those in 
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parliamentary democracies, sub-national authorities have found it increasingly necessary to 
confront the question of how to respond to political extremism.  ―Extremism‖ is a term that may 
in part be defined by local context; indeed, extremism is ironically somewhat like beauty – 
existing mainly in the eye of the beholder.  For present purposes, we therefore adopt Powell’s 
definition: 
The extremist party represents a demand for major transformation of the society, either 
towards some future vision or back to an idealized past.  Such demands diverge from the 
general, current policy consensus; their presence severely strains the ability to reconcile 
expressed interests in the political system.  From this point of view, extremist parties are 
those parties promoting clearly articulated issue proposals that are at odds with those 
promoted by most other parties (1996, 359). 
 
Local councils that enjoy some measure of discretionary fiscal authority and whose 
members are elected in competitive systems can be alluring prizes for any political grouping, 
including pariah or fringe parties.  In anticipation of this reality, institutional designers and 
political party strategists can seek to mitigate the threat that could arise from the potential entry 
by extremists into the council chamber.  The relevant question here is whether institutional 
reformers in one system can derive lessons from experiences elsewhere. 
How do local councils mitigate the negative effects of entry by extremists?  The essential 
dilemma is whether local councils will erect institutional or legal barriers to isolate and contain 
extremists or whether they will instead facilitate access to local power for extremists by 
encouraging coalition executives.  Institutional choices privilege certain party strategies, and 
scholars mapping the fortunes of political extremists in local authorities should seek to 
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understand when and why parties will (1) ignore political extremists in the hope they will simply 
go away, (2) isolate extremists through legal and political means, (3) co-opt their policies, and/or 
(4) allow extremists to share some governing responsibility.     
 
Ignore Political Extremism and It Will Go Away?  Local elections based on majoritarian rules 
are more likely to insulate councils from party-based extremism.  Electoral systems based on 
proportionality with low thresholds for entry, however, present greater opportunities for small, 
new, or fringe parties.  If local executives are selected in a bottom-up parliamentary fashion, then 
extremists can play decisive roles (especially where rules dictate a proportional distribution of 
portfolios).  Alternatively, where local executives are directly elected or are selected in top-down 
fashion by central government, it becomes easier to ignore threats from the margins. Local 
authorities faced with the entry of pariah or extremist parties via elections can in such cases opt 
for institutional inaction or a ―do nothing‖ strategy. By ignoring the extremists, local elites can 
attempt to starve them of both attention and the legitimacy they crave.  Moderates can step back 
and ignore—or at least quietly tolerate-- the extremists’ presence, hoping that incumbency will 
give the pariah the rope with which it will ultimately hang itself. This approach is best articulated 
by George H. Hallett, Jr. who, writing in 1940, spoke directly to the opportunities provided to 
extremists by proportional electoral systems: 
P. R. is often objected to on the ground that it will help extreme parties or groups with 
particular fads that might not otherwise have had a chance of electing anyone. That P. R. 
may give representation to such groups is not to be denied.  But it will not do so unless 
they have a substantial part of the votes…. If an extremist group does have a substantial 
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part of the votes, denying it representation is as silly as an ostrich's sticking his head in 
the sand.   
However, institutional inaction and a ―do nothing‖ strategy run some real risks. Although the 
ultimate objective is the local extremist’s demise, it is also possible that the failure to 
acknowledge conditions that bred a threatening party’s success will likewise fail to reverse the 
flight of voters away from a more moderate local political establishment. If moderate parties turn 
a strategic blind eye it may simply open the door for a fringe party to become a kind of local 
kingmaker, courted by parties across the political spectrum for support in achieving majority 
status or legislative victory. Finally, ignoring political extremism invites the local moderate 
party’s voters, the media, central party headquarters, and the international community to 
reprimand it as being derelict in its ―democratic duties‖ (Downs 2002). 
 
Legal and Political Isolation.  An alternative is to pursue legal, institutional, or political means 
for isolating any party whose credentials for participating in the local assembly appear dubious. 
Imposing legal restrictions on select local parties can take the form of outright bans, creating or 
elevating thresholds for representation in electoral laws (for example, a 5% minimum vote share 
as condition for entry), denying state subsidies for local campaigns, and restrictions on voice.  
Using legal means to muzzle a party that gains voice through accepted institutional channels for 
a message deemed distasteful by some may, however, itself be seen as inconsistent with 
democratic process.  Such an approach may, then, risk further alienating a portion of the 
electorate already suspicious of the establishment (Downs 2001, 27).  Indeed, Harris—drawing 
from the work of Parekh--observes that this strategy stands to produce ―a new breed of 
professional martyrs‖ who go around drawing attention to themselves (1994, 209).  
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Containing local political extremism can also be achieved through political isolation--i.e., 
the construction of a political cordon sanitaire. Local councils designed to allow a formal post-
election coalition formation process can produce broad ―blocking‖ or ―grand‖ coalitions that 
include most or all of the local authority’s established parties could seek to exclude targeted 
groups from any share of executive authority (Downs 1998). The cordon sanitaire’s intended 
payoff is the formation of a clear front in opposition to electorally successful political extremism. 
When, for example, electoral mathematics suggested in 1992 the possibility of a governing 
coalition with the far-right Republikaner Party in Germany’s Baden-Württemberg regional 
assembly (Landtag), the moderate conservative Christian Democrats opted instead for Große 
Koalition with their chief rivals in the Social Democratic Party. The liability of any such alliance 
among normal political antagonists is that there is little to bond the disparate parties except their 
aversion to a common enemy.  If as a consequence the effort to combat local extremists through 
blocking coalitions yields policy gridlock and partisan infighting, then such a strategy may serve 
only to feed the perception of local governing elites as detached, nonresponsive and ineffective, 
causing the populist appeal of the extremists to expand.   
An illustrative example of the dangers of using a post-election coalition formation 
process to isolate threatening parties at the local level is provided by city government in 
Antwerp, Belgium.  Belgium’s more moderate Flemish political parties have consistently 
employed a strategy of political isolation against the far-right Vlaams Belang. In Antwerp an 
awkward alliance of Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals and ecologists has sought to 
maintain a broad, anti-VB blocking coalition in the city government. Electoral and 
institutional rules predisposing the local authority to post-election coalition formation raise 
the spectre of the VB as kingmaker or governing partner, prompting defensive strategies by 
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moderate parties.  While aggressively touting their clean hands to the voters, the local 
Antwerp party establishment has nevertheless proven largely ineffective in coping with the 
core polarizing policy issues that mobilize VB voters (e.g., immigration, employment, law 
and order, and housing).  A concerted effort at excluding the VB at all costs has, therefore, 
made little dent in the VB’s ability to retain its voters. Indeed, ―the stability of the VB’s 
support at successive elections is remarkable‖ (Swyngedouw 2000, 139). While the October 
2006 municipal elections did not hand the mayor’s portfolio to the Vlaams Belang (as some 
had anticipated), the party has more than proved its staying power.  Majoritarian local 
systems—and those that assign local power from the top-down or via a strict proportional 
distribution of portfolios—preempt much of this strategic maneuvering by moderate parties; 
where rules allow for formal coalition formation analogous to that at national level, however, 
the risky game of isolating and blocking becomes possible. 
 
Co-optation.  While some local systems can allow or even encourage the ignoring, banning, or 
blocking of extremist challengers, others can produce incentives for local political elites to co-
opt the very policy positions that won extremist parties their seats in local councils. Local 
councils elected in majoritarian systems are more likely to reward centre-seeking parties, with 
those on the extremes forced to moderate policy positions in order to win.  Alternatively, local 
councils emerging from proportional rules tolerate centre-fleeing, and centrist parties hoping to 
woo back voters lost to the extremes may have to cherry-pick policies from their adversaries. 
Such a strategy is consistent with the classic Downsian (1957) rational calculation that parties 
advance policies to win elections, rather than win elections in order to advance policies. Shifting 
the party's programmatic agenda to tackle head-on the issues that fueled the extremist party’s 
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electoral success will, presumably, win back some of those voters who had fled to the fringe in 
protest. In co-opting more extreme policy positions to retain local office, however, established 
incumbent parties could open themselves up to charges of extremism and stand to lose core 
constituents. In the lexicon of spatial models of multiparty competition this reorientation from 
―policy-seeking‖ to ―vote maximizing‖ office-seeking strategies  draws the condemnation of 
ideological purists as well as observers in the capital.  
 
Collaboration-- Should Local Authorities Grant Pariah Parties Governing Responsibility?  
Among the challenges faced by institutional engineers and party strategists is that of granting 
meaningful shares of governing power to party groups that are both electorally successful and 
judged by the rest of the party system as anti-democratic or anti-system.   How easy should it be 
for local councilors from moderate parties to collaborate and share power with extremists in 
order to realize office-seeking motivations?  Clearly, those systems in which governors, prefects 
or other central (or regional) government officials retain supervisory powers over local 
authorities are more likely to see the composition of local executives shaped or otherwise 
annulled from above.  Such is more likely to also be the case in centralized party systems, where 
national party elites exercise control over the behavior of their local units.  Alternatively, 
building locally autonomous and parliamentary-style councils in decentralized party systems 
based upon proportional representation replicates the democratic dilemma facing moderate 
parties in national assemblies—collaborate, or keep clean hands.   
          Collaboration can emerge in one or more forms: legislative, executive, and electoral. 
Legislative collaboration takes place normally on an ad hoc basis, with mainstream parties 
pooling votes together with an otherwise objectionable party either in support of or against 
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particular pieces of council legislation. Such cooperation may subsequently extend to the 
executive level, with moderate parties agreeing to govern together in coalition with the new 
entrant. If collaboration at the legislative and/or executive levels produces policy successes and 
public acceptance, then the relationship can stretch into the electoral arena with moderate parties 
creating cartels to contest jointly future local elections with the pariah party. Clearly, the risk for 
the moderate party is that in securing short-term electoral, legislative, or executive gains via 
collaboration with local extremists the party appears to voters as having conceded its agenda to 
the exigencies of gaining power. Additionally, fallout from a local party choosing to collaborate 
in some fashion with a pariah at municipal, provincial, or regional level can affect party fortunes 
at the national level. Sub-national decisions to collaborate with local extremists, therefore, are 
often subject to disciplinary action by central party headquarters. 
According to one logic, the responsibility of governing in any democratic system will 
temper the rhetoric and policy positions of political extremists and may even sow the seeds of 
their self-destruction.  If incumbency matters in this complex calculus, then it may well be 
because of what Heinisch (2003) calls the ―filtration effect.‖ Radical local parties or individual 
politicians may gain some measure of governing responsibility by joining as junior members of 
coalitions with more mainstream parties. As the price for entry into coalition, extremists ―will 
invariably be pressured to tone down the radicalness of their agenda and political presentation‖ 
(Heinisch 2003, 101). We can see the willingness by established parties to allow entry 
conditioned upon good behavior as a conscious, if less than ideal, strategic choice. Perceptions 
(real or otherwise) that such pressures for moderation are effective will prompt new internal rifts 
(or exacerbate existing ones) between ideological fundamentalists and pragmatic realists within 
the local pariah party. Those with some measure of governing responsibility will have to narrow 
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and prioritize the agenda to focus on those policy priorities that have a realistic chance of being 
achieved. Pledges of good behavior and the necessitated separation of reckless rhetoric from 
achievable policy will likely prompt greater internal challenges if the strength and electoral 
success of the party varies across regions of the country.  
The experience of a range of local governments in established western democracies (such 
as Belgium’s response to the Vlaams Belang in Antwerp or the French reaction to a proliferation 
of electoral successes by Front National) as well as in transitioning systems (such as Bosnia’s 
struggle with the Croatian Democratic Union and the Serbian Democratic Party) suggests that no 
single strategy holds the key to combating local political extremism and threats to stability in 
local authorities.  Heightening institutional barriers to keep extremists out of the council or its 
executive, as well as political strategies of isolation, ostracism and demonization, can prove 
surprisingly ineffective at rolling back or containing threats to the established order from party-
based extremism. Designing ways to suppress electorally successful local parties—be they in 
Belgium on in Algeria—can backfire on those seeking to enhance local stability and democratic 
performance.  Further, erecting a cordon sanitaire around local extremist parties may give 
mainstream politicians the ability to present their clean hands to the voters; however, ―doing the 
right thing‖ often yields its own unintended and undesired consequences. Likewise, ignoring 
political extremists can produce notably inconsistent results. 
An alternative framework of constructive engagement, manifested as the local 
institution’s relative openness to granting some form of incumbency to those deemed extremists 
and then pursuing ―castration through cooptation,‖ may—somewhat awkwardly and ironically—
prove more successful.  Cross-national experience indicates that democracies should allow entry 
to party representatives legally chosen by voters in free and fair elections, regardless of how 
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unsavory their message.  Two-party majoritarian systems such as that in the United States may 
breed confidence that no real extremist party will capture incumbency; however, erecting 
barriers to entry does not eliminate extremism, and recent American history may suggest that it 
only causes extremism to fester and seek out extra-institutional expressions. While 2% or 5% 
thresholds are justifiable for democracies wishing to minimize the representation of fringe 
parties, electoral systems that systematically exclude those parties consistently gaining 10% or 
more of the vote will likely cultivate resentment and thus prove counterproductive. Local 
political institutions can, though, manage the message of challengers as well as its messengers by 
holding them strictly to the rules of legislative and constitutional order, by holding them to 
public account and intensive scrutiny and exposure, by addressing (rather than sanitizing) 
pressing policy problems embraced by extremists without necessarily co-opting their solutions, 
by creating grand coalitions of parties to govern without the pariah (but only when such is a 
viable vehicle for something other than simply blocking the out-party, i.e., the grand coalition 
should have real policy-making capacity). 
 
Overcoming Social Divisions 
In highly-divided societies, the decentralization of authority to local institutions 
inevitably gives rise to questions about representation.  Will these newly-empowered local 
governments fairly represent the interests of all ethnic (or class or ideological) groups in society?  
Will decentralization contribute to overcoming social divisions or merely exacerbate them?  Will 
citizens ultimately be satisfied with the quality of their representation?  A full review of this 
important subject is beyond the scope of this article, but it is worthwhile to provide a summary of 
our current state of knowledge.   
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Scholars have long debated the relative merits of different electoral systems for 
promoting social accommodation.  Consociationalists (e.g. Lijphart 1977) advocate closed-list 
proportional representation, while centripetalists (e.g. Horowitz 2003) prefer the majoritarian 
system of alternative vote and the proportional system of single transferable vote.  The 
consociational position is that list-proportionality, by reducing the barriers to gaining legislative 
or council seats, ensures that all groups in society will be represented in the corridors of 
government.  Centripetalists object that this approach merely freezes divisions into parties and 
does nothing to overcome them.  They prefer electoral mechanisms that consider voters’ second 
choice preferences and thus encourage candidates to make broad appeals across groups.  
Extending these arguments to legislative-executive relations, consociationalists prefer 
parliamentary systems because they facilitate inter-party (and thus inter-group) bargaining in 
forming the executive.  Centripetalists are more likely to support directly electing executives 
using the alternative vote system.  Pure first-past-the-post systems, where the candidate receiving 
the most votes is automatically elected, receive little support in the literature.   
The best approach to designing local councils will depend on a number of country-
specific conditions.  In countries where groups are geographically segregated, local electorates 
may be homogenous and the issue may be mute.  In such systems decentralization itself can be 
thought of as a way to accommodate geographically distinct groups that demand self-government 
within the same state (although care must be taken here to avoid state breakdown).  In countries 
where localities are mixed, by contrast, list PR will tend to be better when (1) there are a smaller 
number of groups, (2) group divisions are fixed, and (3) elites are more moderate than voters.  In 
societies (such as Papua New Guinea) where there are numerous different groups with somewhat 
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fluid identities, alternative vote or single transferable vote systems may be preferable (see, for 
example, Reilly 2002). 
A host of other factors may well intervene to shape the satisfaction that citizens in 
socially fragmented societies have for the design of their local government institutions and the 
quality of their representation.  Mouritzen (1989) finds that, all else being equal, citizens in small 
jurisdictions consistently hold more favourable attitudes towards participation and democracy.  
DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons (1990) demonstrate the range of individual-level, jurisdiction- 
level, and city- and neighborhood-specific factors that can influence satisfaction and can help 
overcome social divisions.  They, like Mouritzen, find that structural factors independently 
promote citizen satisfaction.  In particular, there is support for the public choice literature’s 
contention that citizens in smaller local units operating under fragmented arrangements will 
experience higher levels of service and accessibility, thereby boosting satisfaction.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Many states are in the process of devolving important powers to local political 
institutions, but the question of how to structure these institutions has received surprisingly little 
attention.  We have argued here that the careful design of local political institutions can 
significantly increase the probability that decentralization reforms will succeed.   
For decentralization to realize its potential for improving governance, it is necessary for 
local governments to be elected.  The electoral process ensures that local officials are not only 
aware of citizen preferences, but that they also have an incentive to deliver on them.  Electoral 
competition also tends to improve governance by threatening incompetent officials with removal, 
although this competition should happen within a stable party system to avoid political instability 
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and budget deficits.  Not least, democratic elections can help ensure that all major interests and 
ideologies within society are represented, strengthening the legitimacy of local institutions and 
encouraging even extremists to moderate and work within the system.  Cross-national experience 
warns against efforts to exclude anti-system parties from government participation, as this 
approach has tended to strengthen such parties in a number of countries.   
When elected local governments are empowered, there is a fairly strong consensus 
among scholars that strong executive authority should be coupled with effective local council 
oversight.  Strong executives, representing the entire locality, should have a greater incentive 
than local council members to provide public goods.  They should also be in a position to 
overcome the common-pooled-resource problem and rein in overspending by the local 
government.  Strong local executives also put a face on local government, strengthening its 
legitimacy and concentrating responsibility in a single individual.  Whether local executives 
should be indirectly elected by the local councils or directly elected by the people has received 
little attention, but it seems likely that either system can be made to work.  Local government 
accountability, however, cannot be maintained without robust council oversight.  Local councils 
should have sufficient administrative and informational resources to ensure that local executives 
are governing honestly and effectively and to provide representation for their constituents.  
Reformers designing these institutions must balance strong executive power with genuine local 
council accountability.  This balance can be struck in many different ways, and the extant 
literature provides little guidance as to which approach is best.  The strongest local councils 
exercise legal control over the budget, elect the executive, and enjoy freedom from the strictures 
of party discipline.  The weakest councils have little control over the budget, do not select the 
executive, and are bound by the dictates of party leaders.  Neither extreme is likely to be ideal. 
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 In designing the structure of local councils themselves, reformers face a series of key 
trade-offs.  Large councils are likely to be more representative and more capable of providing 
robust oversight, but are also likely to be less efficient at decision-making and more costly to 
maintain.  In any case, it is vital that local councils form effective committees to develop 
expertise and monitor the actions of the executive, and that they control sufficient resources and 
raise sufficient taxation to perform their representative functions.   
Another question, vital to any consideration of the structure of local government, 
concerns the role that national parties should play in local elections.  National party involvement 
may encourage local officials to prioritize public over particularistic goods, help to bind the 
various tiers of the political system together, and promote the territorial integrity of the state.  On 
the other hand, if this involvement is too overbearing, it may negate the benefits of 
decentralization by effectively recentralizing the political system.  Again, institutional reformers 
have to strike a balance between shutting out national parties from local politics and allowing 
them to dictate terms to local officials.  This balance can be struck by manipulating the electoral 
and candidate nomination processes at the local level.   
Finally, selecting local electoral institutions involves a trade-off between the effects of 
proportional systems (representing ideological over geographic interests, generating multiparty 
councils, endowing council members with broader interests, increasing the role of national 
parties, reducing the chances of districting and vote-controversies, increasing the probability of 
extremist parties winning seats) and the effects of majoritarian systems (representing geographic 
over ideological interests, generating less divided councils, endowing council members with 
more particularistic interests, reducing the chances of national party intervention in local 
elections, potentially creating districting and vote counting controversies, excluding all but the 
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largest extremist parties).  The choice between list proportional representation and the alternative 
or single transferable vote for overcoming social divisions will depend on the number of groups 
within society and their rigidity. 
Analysis of the scholarly literature, along with a look at international experience, can 
help provide some guidance to reformers considering decentralization.  With careful analysis and 
the balancing of divergent interests, leaders should choose those institutional reforms that will 
ultimately improve governance and representation for their citizens. 
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